Aside from being a callous tyrant, Stalin has been depicted by some economists as the 'owner' of the Soviet Union. Just as the owner of a firm may have an interest in maximizing the value of the firm's output Joseph Stalin, it has been argued, had an interest in raising the output of 'his' domain. Whereas sectoral or cartelistic organizations may have pursued their own special interests, Stalin had an 'encompassing interest' in increasing the social output of the Soviet Union as a whole. As with any dictator, a small fraction of the social surplus went to meeting Stalin's domestic demands (which, with Stalin, were in any case relatively modest). By contrast, the bulk of any growth in social output was directed towards satisfying Stalin's own preference for enhancing the country's military might, expanding its international influence and securing the leader's own personal prestige. With such an exceptionally encompassing and secure interest in the output of his domain 'Stalin was,' to quote Mancur Olson, 'in effect, the owner of the Soviet Union.' 1 The aim of this paper is to press this analogy further using a concrete example, that of theft of public property from the early 1930s to the early 1950s. Specifically the paper tries to ascertain the extent to which Stalin was able to use the criminal justice system to reinforce an increasingly salient category of property rights-'public property'-which Stalin had championed. As we shall see, one of the features of public property was that property rights over it were exercised by different sectors of a bureaucracy presided over by a Politburo under Stalin.
The paper begins with a brief introduction to the property rights school. Whereas
Mancur Olson uses what is sometimes referred to as a 'naïve' version of the model, to which he grafts on interest-group analysis, 2 the paper draws on later versions of the property rights paradigm which accord a more central role to the state. It then goes on to apply some of the insights of the property rights perspective to a series of campaigns which ranged from the early 1930s to the eve of Stalin's death. The paper concludes with an appraisal of the costs to Soviet economic development of Stalin's mode of propertymaintenance and of the varieties which immediately replaced it.
Property Rights
The meaning of the term 'property rights' varies, in large part, in accordance with the intellectual tradition in which it is used. Perhaps the oldest and most venerable approach has viewed property rights as rights assigned to persons or groups by the state.
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Since the 1960s this legal tradition has been complemented by a new wave of economic analyses of property rights. Assuming that a resource may be put to a number of different uses, the economic approach suggests that a system of property rights will specify which uses may be enjoyed by an individual. These uses may range from immediate consumption of a good to its indirect consumption through exchange. Thus a system of property rights may, among other things, define the feasible set of exchanges within a given economic system. Further, division of property rights may involve the delegation of rights whereby some person other than a legal owner is allowed to exercise a certain set of rights over an asset. 4 In this paper I shall be primarily concerned with this second 'economic' approach to property rights, though, given its subject matter-the judicial enforcement of rights-there will also be references to the first, legal, approach.
A system of property rights may be classified according to a number of different criteria. 5 The first concerns the object of ownership. Although types of property may vary (from items such as machines, and resources, such as land, to information in the form of knowledge of a production process), particular attention is customarily given to one special object of ownership: that over the means of production with which further products and services are made. One of the defining features of the Soviet-type system was that the means of production were ostensibly owned publicly, rather than being in private hands, as under capitalism. As we shall see, this distinction was central to Stalin's attitude towards theft. A second criterion for classification concerns identification of the owner. The owner may be an actual person (or group of people) or a legal entity. In the Soviet Union productive property was supposedly owned by the 'people' as represented by the state. One of the premises examined in this paper was that the public weal was in fact 'owned' by the dictator, Joseph Stalin, in the sense that it was he who exercised the most important property rights over productive assets. Finally, a system of property rights may be defined in terms of what the owner is entitled to do. This brings us to the property rights themselves, which are normally broken down into three categories. The first refers to the right to earn and to dispose of residual income from an asset. Where rights of disposal of residual income are full and unrestricted these rights may create strong automatic incentives for the owner. 6 The right to transfer permanently to another party ownership rights over an asset-to sell or alienate an asset-is the second type of property right. Here too the property right may create strong incentives. Where an owner buys and then sells a property they have an interest in ensuring that the net value of the property increases as much as possible. Finally, there are rights of control, or user rights.
These refer to the permissible uses of a property, up to the right to transform or even physically to destroy it. In economic terms rights of control are often more indirect and will ordinarily extend to everyday management questions such as which products should be brought out, what prices should be set for them, and so forth. Rather than exercising a single right of control the owner will normally enjoy a large bundle of specific rights;
where highly valued rights are excluded, the value of an asset may be considerably
lowered.
An important element of the property rights paradigm is that of exclusivity. For one to speak of property at all, there has to be a social mechanism that enforces the assertion of property rights. The resources necessary to ensure the protection of property rights from third parties and to obtain information necessary to exchange property rights (normally through contracts) are referred to as transaction costs. In recent years economists have paid more attention to transaction costs and, in particular, to the role of the state in defining and altering these costs. In this respect there has been an important shift in emphasis since the 1960s. While the first generation of property rights theorists recognized that establishing property rights may be costly, they argued that property rights would nonetheless emerge in response to scarcity, whereby the cost of specifying property rights would be outweighed by the value of the asset in question. Under this theory property rights would emerge in response to exogenous impulses such as new technologies, the opening of new markets, or demographic changes which might affect the relative value of a resource. 7 In this scenario the role of the state was never spelled out; to the extent that the state had any role at all it was assumed to be a positive one in that it would produce the public infrastructure necessary to support property rights. property rights and transaction costs may vary greatly.
The Soviet Union serves as one example of a modern economy with a particular system of property rights and transaction costs. In the absence of price-making markets the transaction costs of valuing productive assets in the Soviet economy were relatively high. 12 At the same time property rights were relatively poorly defined. In the case of the state-owned firm the right of alienation did not exist at all while rights of residual income and of control were exercized by anonymous sectors of the party-state bureaucracy. 13 To the extent that all parts of the bureaucracy were ultimately subordinate to political control by the Politburo and by Stalin we could say loosely that the rights of residual income and control ultimately rested with the leader. 14 Similarly although agricultural cooperatives (i.e. the kolkhozy) nominally enjoyed greater rights, Kornai concludes that when one looks specifically at property rights 'there is little, real tangible distinction under the classical system between the state owned and the cooperative property forms' 15 ; to the extent that property rights over the kolkhozy existed they were exercised by different parts of a bureaucracy ultimately directed by Stalin.
Establishing and maintaining this system of property rights however proved to be enormously costly. As in any system the enforcement of property rights involved excluding others from the use of scarce resources, a function that ultimately depended on coercion. In the rest of this paper we shall see how Stalin sought to delineate 'his'
property rights by means of one of the chief coercive tools available to the state, the criminal justice system. This would entail two steps on Stalin's part. First he devoted considerable energy to establishing the category of 'public property' within criminal law.
As opposed personal property, which referred to non-productive assets in private hands, the concept of 'public property' provided the foundations through which Stalin could exercise property rights over certain strategic resources. Secondly, Stalin took decisive measures to beef up criminal sanctions. As a ruthless leader this incurred few personal costs on Stalin but, as we shall see, the dramatic ratcheting up of punishments imposed significant transaction costs on the Stalinist state.
Theft under Stalin
Stalin resorted to the criminal justice system as a means of excluding third-parties from the use of scarce resources. In this way criminal justice was deployed as a crude device for protecting Stalin's and the soviet bureaucracy's property rights over strategic assets. Soviet leaders however had not always used the justice system in this way. In the early NEP period most property disputes were subject to the civil codes which, by their nature, resolved disagreements strictly between private parties. 16 Property,' became famous for the extremely high tariffs it set for thefts. Equating collective farm and cooperative property with 'state' property it ruled that in thefts of the former two categories the courts apply sentences of death by shooting, or, in mitigating circumstances, terms of confinement of no less than ten years. 21 Apart from its shocking sanctions, the significance of the decree lies in the fact that for the first time in soviet law it introduced the theoretical distinction between theft of public property and the theft of property of individual citizens. In declaratory terms the decree announced that public property was to be regarded as 'sacred and inviolable' and that 'all persons making attempts on its integrity' be viewed as 'enemies of the people.' Technically the decree hardened the emerging distinction between two general categories of theft, the ancient Russian word for stealing, pokhischenie, and khischenie a term of more recent origin which was henceforth reserved for the stealing of state or public property. 22 To the extent that offenders were designated as 'enemies of the people,' the new category of theft of public property was now regarded as a political crime-that is, a crime against the state-and was placed in the official text of the Russian criminal code as an annex to the infamous article 58 on counterrevolutionary crimes.
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The law of 7 August was primarily designed to crush peasant resistance to the regime. Correspondingly, the bulk of cases prosecuted under the decree related to theft of grain in the countryside. The decree, however, was applied to thefts of all kinds of public property. Further, the term 'theft' was extended to include a host of related offenses such as the destruction of state property, the failure to protect state property and, in a supreme court ruling of 1934, even the causing of shortages in the soviet trade system. 24 Following the August decree cases of 'appropriation' (prisvoenie) and 'embezzlement' (rastrata) which previously had been treated separately under article 168 of the criminal code were also brought under the larger umbrella category of khischenie. Nevertheless, efforts such as these to reinforce the state's control rights over grain ran into serious difficulties. In the first place it was not entirely clear from the decree itself which cases merited the death penalty and which custodial sentences. 25 A large share of cases prosecuted under the August decree were in fact for petty theft (that is, for small quantities of grain worth less than fifty rubles). When set against the truly draconian terms of the decree the antitheft campaign contravened the private morality of judges and other state officials who were charged with implementing it. In the Russian Federation judges frequently applied article 51 of the criminal code which entitled them to set terms lower than the minimum prescribed by law; while other officials, including political activists, refused to report thefts, especially minor ones, which had taken place. From the point of view of judges, matters were not helped by the fact that the quality of evidence and the legal standard of prosecution cases was often abysmally low. norm.' The state of course, went back on its word, and increased the rate of tax whenever it saw fit, but it was in the final analysis able to effect the transfer of property from peasants to state: 'For the peasants, all this meant that the grain was no longer his but the state's.' 34 Procurement thus became a device through which the state regularized its control over grain. Although costly in terms of the initial coercion needed to set it up, it was ultimately effective. By contrast the theft campaign proved to be a clumsy and erratic tool for protecting property rights. Although it helped to cow the peasants, the costs to state and legal authority were judged to be too high to be sustained over the long term.
The Edict of 10 August 1940 on Petty Theft
The law of 7 August had served as part of a broader campaign to bring about the submission of the peasantry. It hinged, however, on a key distinction between personal and public property which was consistent with the organizational form of peasant transformation: the bulk of peasants were to work and live on collective farms which were designated as a new type of 'public' or 'socialist' property. Further, whatever their varying costs, the procurement and anti-theft campaigns meant that a substantial proportion of peasant grain could be successfully claimed and used at its discretion by the state.
The edict on petty theft of August 1940 served an entirely different purpose.
Along with a raft of other laws and edicts, the main aim of the August decree was to help the regime manage the industrial labour force. In the absence of strong positive incentives the state hoped to use criminal law to raise the overall performance of the industrial economy on the eve of the war. Earlier efforts, in the mid-1930s, to manipulate industrial production through criminal law had, to be sure, not fared well. 35 The main thrust of prewar criminal legislation on industry was to have a different slant. The celebrated edict of 26 June 1940 criminalized unauthorized quitting (with a prison term of two to four months) and shirking (with a sanction of one to six months' corrective work and a deduction of earnings of up to 25%) by workers. 36 This criminalization of labour infractions was instituted in response to charges on the eve of the war that planned targets
were not being met because of high labour turnover and the concomitant labour shortages. Through a combination of direct means (criminalizing unauthorized quitting) and indirect ones (removing the incentive to commit disciplinary infractions) this extension of criminal law was intended to bind workers to their enterprises. The edict on petty theft which followed six weeks later was entirely in keeping with this logic. The main purpose of the edict was to prevent workers from 'staging' thefts in order to be dismissed from an enterprise. Whereas the vast majority of petty thefts had previously led to non-custodial sentences (if they led to prosecutions at all), the edict of 10 August set a minimum term of one year's imprisonment for petty theft in factories. This was supposed to act as a deterrent to those workers who contemplated theft as a means of getting shot of a factory and thereby regaining their personal mobility.
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The edict of 10 August fitted into no ideological framework at all. It was not presented as strengthening the regime's hold of 'public' property. 38 Given the minute sums involved it would have been even harder than normal to construe the campaign in these terms. Indeed the campaign led to a perverse situation whereby defendants charged with 'petty' theft faced stiffer terms than those who had committed 'ordinary' (i.e. by their nature, more serious) thefts. The primary goal of the campaign was quite different:
to enable the regime to manage the labour force.
In fact, the significance of the August edict lay elsewhere. 
The Edicts of 4 June 1947
The theft edicts of 1947 were imposed in response to two trends which had become apparent over the preceding years. The first and most immediate concern was the rise in the volume of theft cases, especially theft of social property, which had occurred in the midst of war. Acute wartime shortages had given rise to a profusion of small-scale thefts of grain and other foodstuffs, epecially amongst women and children. (See Table   1 .) The emergency distribution system also gave rise to various forms of covert misappropriation, such as 'self-service' (samosnabzhenie) at worker supply departments (ORSy), the forging of ration cards, the counterfeiting of food and industrial vouchers, and embezzlement, all of which were commonly treated, with a certain amount of license by the regime, as forms of 'theft.' 39 Following a campaign against thefts of grain and farm produce in 1944 theft convictions fell. 40 However the catastrophic harvest and consequent food shortages of autumn 1946 led to another sharp rise in theft cases, which mushroomed from 218,960 in 1945 to 263,085 the following year. 41 A second factor which prompted the theft decrees was the unraveling of stalinist property forms which had become evident at the close of the war. Particularly in the formerly occupied regions to the west collective and state farms had given way to alternative types of ownership, especially as a result of the expansion of the private plot.
According to one source, by the end of 1946 there had been 2,255,000 cases of illegal misappropriation of land involving 4.7 million hectares. 42 Further, in the aftermath of the war, regional and district party committees had taken to requisitionng farm produce and property from six months to seven years; maxima for the two crimes were set at six years and ten years respectively. Those who stole state property a second time were to receive a custodial sentence of between ten and 25 years. 47 The June decrees were accompanied by a barrage of articles and pamphlets in which the public were treated to recycled pre-war quotations from Stalin on the need to defend public property. 48 The June decrees had a devastating impact on the lives of those convicted of theft.
Not only had Stalin removed the discretion of judges to apply lighter sentences in ordinary cases but, in an unpublicised directive of the council of ministers, it was resolved that the new decrees would also supersede the edict of 10 August on petty theft. 52 As a direct consequence of the decrees, the average sentence for theft of public property more than doubled from 3.2 years to 8.7 years while the increase for theft of personal property was, in relative terms, even more striking, from 1.3 to 6.2 years. (See Table 2 .) In fact, in view of the share of theft cases among all cases prosecuted in the courts (never less than a third), the June decrees were to change the whole thrust of sentencing policy (See Table 3 ).
The relationship between the June decrees and the volume of theft cases is complex. 53 The immediate effect of the decrees was to bring about a sharp increase in the Although the upward turn in sentencing and the growth in cases applied in equal measure to personal and public property pride of place throughout the campaign was given to the latter category. Daily newspapers and the legal journals regularly returned to Stalin's pre-war slogans on the centrality of public property to the constitution and to the legal system. Justice leaders, too, highlighted the special 'political' significance of the decree on protecting public property. This outward commitment was matched by the tone of internal communiques. Reports to Stalin from justice leaders on the general state of criminality in the USSR accorded a high priority to theft of public property, while theft of personal property was pushed down the hierarchy of categories. 54 Memorandums exchanged by party officials also made it clear that the theft of public property should assume top priority, and they expressly ruled out the possibility that thefts of personal property should carry heavier sanctions than thefts of socialist property. 55 In addition, the justice agencies were given special responsibility to reclaim losses which had arisen from public property thefts. Table 4 .) In its own typically cruel and clumsy way, the post-war state used criminal justice to prop up the bureaucracy's rights to key assets while restricting the rights of others.
Owing to the laudable moral resistance of some judges and the bureaucratic incentives impinging on procurators, between 1947 and 1951 convictions for both kinds of theft (as well as for speculation and service crimes) fell to rates well below those that had existed prior to the adoption of the June decrees. 59 As Poskrebyshev's speech, in which he fused some of Stalin's earlier slogans on public property, was particularly combative:
Comrade Stalin teaches us that the safeguarding of socialist property is one of the basic functions of our state. Soviet law strictly punished pilferers of public property. The Stalin Constitution states that persons who infringe on socialist property are enemies of the people…Comrade Stalin has pointed out that a thief who pilfers public property and undermines the interests of the national economy is the same as a spy and a traitor if not worse. 
Conclusion
The management of the economy following Stalin's death remained, in many respects, hugely inefficient. Serviceable information on economic capacity and the value of assets became even harder to come by as agents found it easier to collude and deceive superiors, while, with the passage of time, prices from the pre-communist period became even less relevant as markers of relative scarcity. 65 By the late 1950s favourable conditions for economic growth had declined as surplus labour was exhausted and the transaction costs of technological progress mounted. 66 Even by the standards of Stalin's successors, however, the enforcement costs of maintaining the economy in a perpetual state of emergency had been intolerably high. Recognizing that tax rates, especially on the peasantry, had been excessively high-thus distorting incentives-the new leaders relaxed them. Aside from wider efforts to scale down repression by curtailing the powers of the secret police, Stalin's successors also sought to lessen the role of criminal justice as a tool for managing the economy. Overbearing criminal sanctions had incurred high transaction costs in the form both of overzealous agents who had engaged in acts of vigilantism and arbitrary seizures, and in the form of moral and courageous judges who had resisted and circumvented the new laws, often at some risk to themselves.
Consequently, after Stalin's death criminal penalties were lowered, not least for thefts of socialist property.
Stalin did, however, have one major advantage over this successors. To quote
Olson: 'Wheareas a dictator like Stalin had an exceptionally encompassing interest in the productivity of the society, each coterie of subordinates engaging in tacit collective action in each industry, office, or locality had only a narrow interest…Thus over time the single most important incentive to increase output under the central plan in a Soviet-type economy-became less potent…' 67 In order to secure this encompassing interest, the dictator embarked on an all out attack on private property. In this respect the criminal justice system was essential to Stalin because it enabled him to harden the distinction between public property and other forms, and to translate the theoretical category 'public property' into concrete and practical everyday terms. Throughout his tenure Stalin constantly returned to the topic of public property, and, each time he did this, his renewed interest was accompanied by a campaign against thefts of socialist property. The criminal justice system was, of course, an incredibly clumsy tool for specifying the dictator's property rights. By contrast, however, property rights in the post-Stalin regime had become so dispersed that it became hard to speak of them existing at all. 63-66. 6 Residual income refers to the income accruing to the owner once all the costs associated with utilizing the property have been deducted. Residual income is sometimes equated with 'rent.' This however can be misleading. To illustrate this, Kornai presents the example of a tenant farmer who pays a fixed rent to the landowner for the use of the land: 'In this case the residual income is made up of the income from the produce of the land, less all costs, including the rent. To that extent, it is the tenant who has [the right to residual income from] the produce and not the landowner.' Kornai, Socialist System, 64 fn.5. 7 One of the earliest and most influential articles in this tradition saw property rights as emerging to 'internalize externalities.' 'What converts a harmful or beneficial effect [of an action] into an externality,' wrote Harold Demsetz, ' is that the cost of bringing that effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interaction parties is too high to make it worthwhile… 'internalizing' such effects refers to a process, usually a change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting parties.' 'Increased internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic values, changes which stem from the development of new technology and the opening of new markets…' Demsetz, 'Toward a Theory,' 350. 8 Among the many positive and seemingly automatic functions of the state in lowering transactions costs are its role in maintaining standards of measurement and in introducing a stable currency since variable and unpredictable inflation could increase the cost of transacting. 9 The term 'naïve model ' 12 This was especially the case if these assets were to be valued in terms of the preferences of consumers. 'In practice,' writes Eggertson, 'the allocation of resources in such systems is in part based on planners' preferences.' Eggertsson, Economic Behaviour, 37. 13 As Kornai acknowledges it is relatively hard to define in clear-cut terms in the soviet case what one means by 'residual income.' However one defines it, the magnitude of the residual income is set by the bureaucracy and it is the bureaucracy that possesses right of disposal over it. At the same time no individual member of the bureaucracy has a total right of disposal over the residual income which is restricted by a web of regulations and prohibitions. Similarly, although rights of control-which as suggested earlier usually include a large assortment of rights-are exercised by the bureaucracy as a whole they are unevenly distributed across the bureaucracy. To further complicate matters, the bureaucratic sector exercising direct control over state-owned firms is separated organizationally from the apparatus handling financial affairs and, accordingly, the rights over residual income. Thus in the socialist sytem '[t]he depersonalizing of property becomes extreme. Whatever state-owned firm one takes as an example, there is no individual, family or small group of partners to whom one can point as owners…State property belongs to all and to none.' See Kornai, Socialist System, 73-75. 14 This clearly is a view that would not be shared by Kornai who argues: 'Since the connection between the 'personal pocket' and the residual income of the state-owned firm is entirely absent, those who have the deciding voice in how the residual income is used are not real owners at all…Since no one can pocket the profits and no one need pay out of his own pocket for the losses, property in this sense is not only depersonalized but eliminated.' Ibid, 74-75. In Olsonian terms however there was a connection between Stalin's 'personal pocket' and residual income write large in that the leader personally benefited from a rise in social output of 'his' domain and stood to lose from any fall. In a sense Kornai allows for this possibility when he acknowledges that 'Only at the very top are the two branches of the bureaucracy [exercising rights of control and of residual income] under the common direction of the party general secretary, the Political Committee, and the government.' See ibid, 74. 15 Kornai, Socialist System, 80. The one exception, which Kornai freely acknowledges, is the existence of individual rights within cooperatives over household plots. 16 As Berman notes the 1923 civil code dealt in traditional terms with such matters as property, contracts, legal transactions and unjust enrichment. 'Ownership,' he writes, 'was defined in Napoleonic terms as 'the right to possess, to use, and to dispose of' one's property. ' 23 Chapter one of the special part of the code, on 'State crimes,' included two sections, counterrevolutionary crimes (art.58), and 'Crimes against the administrative order which are especially dangerous to the USSR' (art.59). Note however that although the decree as a whole was appended to article 58, the decree only specifically identified cases in which 'kulak-capitalist elements either resort to or preach violence or utter threats against collective farmers in order to coerce the latter into leaving their collective farms' as 'crimes against the state.' See Zile, Ideas and Forces, 266. 24 The supreme court ruling of 9 June 1934 in effect equated the causing of shortages with 'stealing' by placing the burden of proof on the defense to demonstrate that where shortages had occurred the accused had not appropriated the property and used it in his or her interest. See Berman, Soviet Criminal Law, 35, 80-81. 25 This was partly resolved by the board of the ministry of justice and the supreme court which issued directives reserving capital punishment for persons convicted of organized and serious thefts, for kulaks and class-hostile elements, and for kulaks who stole grain from cooperative farms. When kolkhozniki or private peasants stole grain they were to receive ten years' imprisonment. See Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, 113-114. 26 30 The terms 'public' and 'socialist' property were used interchangeably. Article 5 of the constitution stated that socialist property consisted of state property (belonging to the people as a whole) and cooperative and collective farm property (property belonging to collective farms or cooperative societies). For the first time article 6 identified in detail the objects of state property while article 7 described the objects of collectivefarm property. For an English translation, see Jan F. 34 Lewin, 'Taking Grain,' 142, 157, 174. The high level and variability of the procurement 'tax' (aside from the other taxes) necessarily meant that the 'zagotovk i as 'incentive' did not seem to work.' Thus in a way which seems to have prefigured a New Institutional analysis Lewin recognized the conflict in the system between the high transaction costs and economic growth: 'To base the economic activity of a whole branch, and of a social class, on 'taking' without rewarding would be inconceivable without the application of mass coercion on a permanent basis. But tools and energies needed for such a compulsory process were different from and contradictory to tools and energies which were necessary for promoting kolkhozy as successful producers and a viable socio-economic structure.' Ibid, 166, 174. 35 The primary example of this had been the edict of 8 December 1933 which had made directors and other managers of industrial enterprises liable for the production of substandard goods and subject to a minimum punishment of five years. Despite high level endorsement, however, the edict was subjected to highly restrictive interpretations by judges many of whom insisted on the showing of intent-a difficult thing to prove in court-and to resistance from industrial ministries who petitioned the courts to drop prosecutions against favoured managers. Within nine months prosecutions had, according to Solomon, 'slowed to a mere trickle.' For similar reasons an analogous edict on defective goods of 10 July 1940 led to few convictions and, according to Solomon, 'had largely symbolic meaning.' Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, 145-147, 326-327. 36 The criminalization of shirking was designed to prevent workers from using slacking as a pretext for dismissal. To this end the edict forbade managers to fire workers for shirking. Similarly, in order to reduce labour turnover permission to quit was made harder to obtain. 37 In order to facilitate prosecution of the campaign Stalin ordered that procedural requirements be relaxed. However, in the face of stern resistance from disgruntled judges and from factory managers reluctant to
